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We argue that mainstream FDI theory underplays financial motivations for interna-
tional investment, and suggest several possible channels for a distinct cost-of-capital 
effect on FDI. Using a sample of European firms’ cross-border acquisitions, and con-
trolling for traditional firm-level determinants of FDI, we find strong evidence in fa-
vor of a cost-of-equity effect, whereas the effect of debt costs is indeterminate. We 
further find that financial determinants are more important for firms originating in 
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Different theories and research traditions compete about providing the logic behind 
and the determinants of firms’ decisions to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI). 
However, whether one emphasizes a firm’s ownership advantages (e.g. Dunning 
(1977)), its knowledge capital (Markusen (1984)), or its potential for gaining econo-
mies of scale and scope by internalizing transactions (Buckley and Casson (1976); 
Rugman (1981)), the focus is on real side factors. The financial side, by contrast, is 
typically allotted the role of a passive source of funds, which smoothly and efficiently 
responds to firms’ needs and demands. Historically, this can be attributed to the fact 
that mainstream FDI theory has made the (implicit) simplifying assumptions of fric-
tionless financial markets and perfect international financial integration (with some 
exceptions – see e.g. Aliber (1970)). In addition, FDI theory has generally assumed 
that direct investments are similar to bonds and other portfolio assets for which the 
price and the nominal returns are always in the same currency (Blonigen (1997)). 
Much of this stands at odds with the current theory of finance and financial 
markets, and relaxing these assumptions can have potentially far-reaching implica-
tions for our understanding of the motivations for cross-border direct investment as 
well. This can to some extent be illustrated by the progress made in capturing the ef-
fect of exchange rates on FDI over the last decade or two (see, e.g., Froot and Stein 
(1991)) by relaxing the efficient markets assumption. This progress notwithstanding, 
this paper argues that the role of firm-level financial determinants of FDI remains to 
be properly considered. 
  We draw on, inter alia, recent developments in the FDI literature and results 
on the relationship between finance and domestic investment to argue that a firm’s 
financial position is not merely a by-product of traditional FDI determinants, such as 
general economies of scale or investment opportunities, but that the assumptions of   3
information asymmetries in financial markets and (partial) capital market segmenta-
tion between countries open up a number of possible mechanisms which may give 
rise to a distinct cost of capital effect on cross-border direct investment. 
Controlling for ‘traditional’ FDI determinants, we empirically test the effect of 
a number of firm-level financial characteristics on the probability of undertaking a 
cross-border acquisition in a series of binary response (probit) models. The results, 
based on a sample of 1459 European non-financial firms’ cross-border acquisitions in 
a total of 44 target markets, reveal a consistently significant explanatory power of eq-
uity-related finance variables over a number of different specifications, and regardless 
of the proxy used for equity market valuation. According to expectation, the effect of 
debt costs, on the other hand, is indeterminate. Financial determinants also prove to be 
more important for firms originating in countries that are relatively less financially 
developed (indicating the importance of eliminating a ‘financial disadvantage’ for an 
internationalizing firm). Moreover, the hypothesis that financial motivations for FDI 
are stronger for more knowledge-intensive firms receives strong support from the 
data, whereas a more general systematic variation in FDI-finance sensitivity by indus-
try cannot be unequivocally inferred. 
All in all, the results strengthen the case for a more prominent role for finan-
cial explanations of cross-border direct investment, and press for further work explor-
ing the link between finance and FDI. 
The article is organized in the following way. Section I outlines a number of 
mechanisms whereby financial factors can be identified as independent drivers of 
FDI. The ensuing section presents the empirical methodology. In Section III we pre-
sent the variables and the dataset. Results are presented and discussed in Section IV, 
and Section V concludes.   4
 
I. Financial determinants of FDI  
Existing theories of FDI and of multinationals’ cross-border operations have devel-
oped along parallel paths within the economics and management literatures, but es-
sentially coincide in terms of the basic explanations of why firms invest across bor-
ders. The focus is largely on a firm’s ownership of intangible assets that can be ex-
ploited by FDI. Because foreign firms are generally at a cost disadvantage relative to 
local firms when entering a new geographical market, it must have some compensat-
ing advantage – often termed an ‘ownership advantage’ – which is transferable abroad 
and of such magnitude that it may compensate for the extra costs that are associated 
with doing business abroad. Such assets, or advantages, may include various econo-
mies of scale and scope,
1 a superior technology, or other types of proprietary knowl-
edge, such as managerial and marketing expertise (Caves (1971)). 
Internalization theory (Buckley and Casson (1976); Hymer (1976); Rugman 
(1981)) views these intangible assets as a firm-specific ‘public good’ which is trans-
ferable within the firm at a lower transaction cost than would be achieved were the 
asset to be transferred in any other way between different markets. Markusen (1984) 
and Horstmann and Markusen (1989) argue that this strongly suggests that multina-
tionality (and hence FDI) is more prevalent in industries where knowledge-based as-
sets are important, because the services of such assets are more easily transported in-
ternationally, and they can be supplied to additional production sites at virtually zero 
marginal cost. Within the industrial organization literature, these insights form the 
basis of what is often called the ‘knowledge capital’ model of MNCs, whereas in the 
international business field, ownership advantages and internalization factors often 
join hands with ‘location’ factors (such as local market size, wage costs, taxes, etc.) to   5
form the so-called ‘OLI’ framework for explaining why a particular firm undertakes 
direct investment in a particular destination country (Dunning (1977, 1988)). 
While FDI theory thus largely builds on assumptions of market imperfections, 
these assumptions have rarely been extended to explicitly include financial markets, 
or – when they have – focus has been on explaining the effect of exchange rates 
(rather than firm-level financial characteristics) on FDI (Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994); 
Froot and Stein (1991); see below). A possible reason is that FDI theory early on 
made the simplifying assumptions of efficient financial markets and international fi-
nancial integration, and the theory developed with these assumptions as given.
2 In ad-
dition, some conceivable sources of a ‘finance’ effect on FDI can clearly be accom-
modated within existing theory; for example, an ‘internal capital markets’ view on 
MNCs (Stein (1997)) marries well with FDI theory if the internal capital market is 
viewed as an intangible asset which is ‘internalized’.
3  
Regardless of the reason, it is clear that financial factors have never quite 
‘caught on’ as an explanation for FDI on equal footing with more general ‘asset ad-
vantage’ and ‘internalization’ determinants, and we were hard-pressed to find any 
empirical applications at all considering financial variables from within the FDI litera-
ture. De Santis et al. (2004) test stock market valuations (measured by Tobin’s q) as a 
determinant of Euro area aggregate FDI in the United States 1980-2001, but use 
Tobin’s q as a proxy for traditional FDI determinants – in particular intangible assets. 
This both homes in on our main message, and puts the finger on an empirical compli-
cation: the point of a financial effect on FDI would be that a valuation effect remains 
after controlling for ‘fundamental’ (real) factors inherent in that valuation. 
Motivating a finance-FDI effect requires the assumption of some degree of in-
ternational financial market segmentation. This might in itself require some motiva-  6
tion, but ample evidence support our view of international capital markets as charac-
terized by what we may term ‘partial segmentation’.
4 Allowing for (partial) segmenta-
tion, one can distinguish between two main groups of mechanisms whereby finance 
could matter for FDI: reactive and proactive firm behavior (Oxelheim et al. (2001)). 
The first group refers to firms’ responses to financial market imperfections 
(and international capital market segmentation). The potential role of ‘reactive’ firm 
behavior as a determinant of FDI under financial market imperfections was identified 
early on, and has surfaced in the literature from time to time (but without ever making 
much of a mark). For instance, Aliber (1970) suggests that capital market segmenta-
tion implies that a multinational firm has an advantage over local firms in that its mul-
tinationality enables it to raise capital with a lower exchange rate risk premium, and 
thus a lower overall cost. Assuming more or less permanent capital market segmenta-
tion implies that also risk-adjusted capital costs differ across countries, which would – 
in turn – imply a finance-FDI effect in simple discount-factor terms: some countries’ 
firms will find foreign investment projects profitable that are forgone by local firms 
because in net-present-value terms, local and foreign firms value the project differ-
ently. 
We do not have to assume permanent segmentation to find valuation effects. 
The combination of temporary mispricing of company fundamentals by the market 
and opportunistic managers has been suggested as explanation for ‘excessive’ stock 
market effects on investment (both capital expenditure and acquisitions) domestically 
(see, e.g., Morck et al. (1990); Baker et al. (2003); Shleifer and Vishny (2003); Gil-
christ et al. (2005)), and may be extended to the international case under relatively 
general assumptions. The basic argument is that if the market places a higher value on 
the firm’s fundamentals than the managers, then managers should capitalize on the   7
mispricing, issue stock, and invest in positive-NPV projects given the ‘mispriced’ cost 
of capital, rather than basing investment policy on their own perception of fundamen-
tals (for a concise exposition of the arguments and counterarguments, see Blanchard 
et al. (1993)). The international analogy would be to issue stock locally and invest in-
ternationally. As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), mispricing may be idiosyn-
cratic or attributable to some specific industry, group of firms, or geographic area. As-
suming some degree of correlation between the mispricing of stocks within a country 
(for example, due to a geographic component in mispricing, or an industry-specific 
component with distinct industrial structures across countries), cost of capital may 
drive not only investment and acquisitions domestically, but may represent a particu-
lar (temporary) advantage – or disadvantage, in the case of undervaluation – for un-
dertaking foreign investment projects. 
Discount-factor-type motivations for a finance-FDI effect are similar to tradi-
tional motivations for FDI in that they assume that some firms have an advantage 
which makes them value foreign investment projects differently than local firms. In 
fact, a financial influence on FDI may occur even without such valuation effects, in 
the presence of both financial constraints and capital market segmentation. This type 
of explanation is analogous with leading theories of the exchange rate effect on FDI. 
Froot and Stein (1991) is the first widely quoted paper to impose a financial market 
imperfection as the source of an unequivocal exchange rate effect. They do it by as-
suming that some, particularly information-intensive, investments cannot be 100 per-
cent externally financed. In this situation, a real depreciation of the ‘domestic’ cur-
rency will enable a ‘foreign’ bidder to bring more net wealth to the investment at 
equal cost, thereby outbidding the domestic bidder. The effect occurs despite perfect   8
international financial integration and despite equal valuations of the acquired as-
set/investment by the domestic and the foreign firm (Klein and Rosengren (1994)). 
Froot and Stein’s (1991) wealth effect presumes a financing constraint akin to 
the one underpinning ‘pecking-order’ theories of capital structure: as a consequence 
of information asymmetries between managers and providers of external capital, the 
marginal cost of outside debt and equity may exceed the opportunity cost of internal 
financing, and the firm will therefore prefer to finance a share of investments with 
cash and retained earnings (Myers and Majluf (1984); Fazzari et al. (1988)) – hence 
the importance of firm wealth. The authors argue that this type of information asym-
metry is much more likely for direct investment projects than for portfolio invest-
ments, which are more uniform, and therefore that FDI should be more exchange-rate 
sensitive than cross-border portfolio investments. They also assume, however, that 
financing constraints are equal across countries, and that the wealth effect occurs 
through real exchange rate changes. This follows from the maintained assumption of 
perfect international capital mobility. Relaxing this assumption, the wealth effect 
could simply be the effect of differences in financial constraints. There is ample evi-
dence in favor of such differences, not least from the finance-growth literature.
5 
Baker et al. (forthcoming) note that relative wealth shocks of the type that re-
sult from exchange rate changes in Froot and Stein (1991) may also originate in stock 
market price misalignments if such misalignments are not symmetrical across all 
countries, and if stock market mispricing influences the perception of the firm’s col-
lateralizable wealth in the eyes of prospective lenders. They discuss the possibility of 
an effect on FDI through a ‘cheap finance’ channel (source-country overvaluation) 
and/or a ‘cheap assets’ channel (host-country undervaluation). Testing for these ef-
fects on aggregate annual data on in- and outward US FDI over the 1974-2001 period,   9
they find strong evidence in favor of a ‘cheap finance’ effect on FDI. The results, they 
argue, are evidence of international arbitrage by multinationals, and speculate that this 
is due to certain advantages of MNCs relative to portfolio investors in conducting ar-
bitrage – the most important being less binding short-sales constraints. 
Another advantage of MNCs, which cannot be exploited by portfolio inves-
tors, is suggested by Blonigen (1997). The main tenor of Blonigen’s contribution is 
really to suggest an alternative mechanism whereby exchange rates may matter for 
some acquisition FDI. The ‘pull’ effect of the target’s knowledge-based assets (such 
as a productivity-enhancing innovation) plays a central role. Blonigen observes that in 
a segmented production process, such assets are not necessarily similar to portfolio 
investments where the price and the returns are in the same currency, but may yield 
returns across a variety of markets and currencies without any exchange rate transac-
tions. These assets may therefore be valued differently by ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ 
buyers if the real exchange rate changes, even if the firms have the exact same financ-
ing possibilities.
6 The implication of Blonigen’s findings is that exchange rates should 
be more important as determinants of acquisition FDI within industries where target 
firms are likely to possess significant (knowledge-based) firm-specific assets. 
There are thus several conceivable mechanisms by which firms’ reactions to 
financial market inefficiencies may drive foreign investment. We called this group of 
explanations ‘reactive’ firm behavior. The second group refers to proactive motiva-
tions for a finance-FDI effect. Here, Oxelheim et al. (2001) also make imperfect fi-
nancial integration and remaining home bias in world capital markets their point of 
departure. They assume a two-tier world capital market with partial segmentation be-
tween national capital markets, where a local firm can choose to stay in its home mar-
ket and face the local cost of capital, or invest in ‘proactive financial strategies’ to in-  10
ternationalize its cost of capital and reap the benefits of the economies of scale and 
scope attributable to a multinational firm. Such financial strategies may include cross-
listing its stock in a more liquid stock market (Sundaram and Logue (1996); Foerster 
and Karolyi (1999); Miller (1999); Pagano et al. (2002)), foreign issues of equity 
and/or debt (Modén and Oxelheim (1997)), and ‘bonding’ strategies to reduce infor-
mation asymmetries (Oxelheim and Randøy (2003)). This type of strategies, they 
suggest, may foment ownership advantages – or, rather, eliminate a financial disad-
vantage – and such firms are considerably more likely to continue the internationali-
zation process by undertaking FDI. Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) study one such 
proactive strategy. They find that European firms that have cross-listed their stock in 
the US market are significantly more likely to make acquisitions in the US. They in-
terpret the results in terms of the European firms’ need for a viable ‘M&A currency’, 
their need to reduce information asymmetries, and overcoming home bias. This is just 
another way of wording the need to reduce a financial ownership disadvantage. To the 
extent that a stock listed on, say, the New York Stock Exchange is a more viable ac-
quisition currency not just in the US but anywhere in the world, this effect may hold 
more generally. 
To sum up, if financial markets are to some degree inefficient and/or (par-
tially) segmented internationally, a cost of capital effect on FDI can occur through 
‘reactive’ or ‘proactive’ firm behavior in response to those inefficiencies. Possible 
mechanisms for a finance-FDI effect can be derived from theories motivating a fi-
nance-investment effect domestically or from theories underpinning an exchange rate 
effect on FDI. There is much to suggest that finance-specific advantages are more im-
portant for firms in more knowledge-intensive industries. We also argued that such 
advantages are more important for firms resident in countries with relatively illiquid   11
and/or segmented domestic capital markets. We cannot distinguish directly between 
the different mechanisms empirically; instead, we will in what follows indirectly test 
for various implications of the different mechanisms, present strong evidence that fi-
nance does matter, and draw tentative conclusions about which mechanisms are more 
important. The following section explains the empirical methodology. 
 
II. Methodology 
Based on the implications of the literature reviewed above, we test three main hy-
potheses: Hypothesis 1: firms’ financial attributes exert a distinct effect (that is, an 
effect which is independent of fundamentals) on their propensity to undertake foreign 
direct investment; Hypothesis 2: financial determinants of FDI are more important for 
firms in industries where investments are more knowledge-intensive and where target 
firms are more likely to have firm-specific assets that yield returns that are non-
currency-specific; Hypothesis 3: financial determinants of FDI are more pronounced 
for firms resident in countries with a lower level of financial development. We also 
subject the results to a number of robustness tests, including tests where we control 
for location (target-market) effects. 
 
A. Which firms make foreign acquisitions? 
We start by testing Hypothesis 1 in a series of binary response (probit) regression 
models. The completion of a foreign acquisition is an indicator (dummy) variable, and 
it is regressed on firm financial characteristics, a set of ‘traditional’ FDI determinants, 





    otherwise,   0





ACQ    12
   where 
 
* '''. ii i i i ACQ F X C α βδ γε =+ + + + (1) 
ACQi denotes the decision by firm i to make a foreign acquisition, Fi is a vector of 
finance-related variables for firm i, Xi is a vector of non-financial firm-level determi-
nants of FDI, Ci is a set of control variables, and εi is an error term. This constitutes 
our ‘baseline regression’ model. The simple idea is that if (any of) the included fi-
nance-related variables turn out significant, then we would have made a case for our 
claim that finance matters for FDI. The next set of tests deals with a potentially im-
portant empirical complication arising from this basic layout. 
 
B. Financial strength or investment opportunities? 
The empirical complication is that any proxy for the cost of equity we might choose 
to use in Equation 1 (such as Tobin’s q – i.e., the market value over the book value of 
a firm’s assets – or other standard ratios for stock market valuation that use the market 
value or stock price of a firm) may easily be argued to really capture something else 
than a strictly financial factor. In a standard investment-q equation, q is generally in-
terpreted as a proxy for investment opportunities (domestic or foreign), and so the 
significance of q (or other candidate valuation measures correlated with it) as a de-
terminant of a firm’s propensity to undertake foreign acquisitions in a regression of 
the type outlined in the previous subsection really reflects an ‘ex-finance’ factor. Spe-
cifically, it is a reflection of the market’s rational valuation of the firm’s prospects for 
generating cash flow in the future.
7 Put differently, the argument is that the cost of 
equity simply reflects the firm’s marginal product of capital (rather than the other way 
around).
8   13
  In order to tackle this complication we follow a simple way to decompose eq-
uity valuation into an ‘investment opportunity’ part and a ‘financial advantage’ part. 
The approach basically entails orthogonalizing q against ex post observed ‘future’ in-
vestment (capital expenditure). We use this approach instead of simply controlling for 
average capital expenditure in the baseline regression in order to make better use of 
the time series dimension in the data, and in order to use the resulting variable more 








α βε =+ +  (2) 
where I is investment, K is the capital stock, and V is market value; i and t are firm 
and period subscripts; V/K equals Tobin’s q. Because the stock market is forward 
looking, we may lag the right hand side variables, or, equivalently, include investment 
with a one-period lead, to represent ‘investment opportunities’ rather than simultane-









+ = ++  (3) 
To the extent that future relative capital expenditure is a fair proxy for present invest-
ment opportunities, residuals from this regression are proxies for a ‘purely financial’ 
cost of equity factor.  If used and found significant in a regression of the type repre-
sented by Equation 1, they point toward a mispricing-type explanation for the finance 
effect on FDI. (The fitted values from a regression of Equation 3, on the other hand, 
are proxies for an investment-opportunity factor inside the q-effect.) ‘Mispricing’ 
could entail overvaluation/’bubble’ effects (Shleifer and Vishny (2003); Gilchrist et 
al. (2005)), and/or initial undervaluation/segmentation of the acquiring firm which has   14
been ‘corrected’ – possibly as the result of conscious strategies by the firm to dimin-
ish information asymmetries, etc. (Oxelheim et al. (2001)). 
  One might surmise that, because FDI and acquisitions are also investments, 
we are stripping q of all its predictive power on the dependent variable in Equation 1, 
but this is not necessarily the case. First, as argued in Section I, if any overvaluation 
(undervaluation) reflected in q is somewhat correlated across firms within a source 
country, the residual valuation factor will represent a particular advantage (disadvan-
tage) for undertaking foreign investment projects. It follows from an assumption of 
international financial market segmentation that local risk factors matter more for the 
pricing of stocks. This suggests to us that the mispricing component in those prices 
may be correlated within countries. Second, while we test the finance-sensitivity of 
foreign acquisitions, the correction for investment opportunities is made using relative 
capital expenditure.
9 Therefore, we will not ‘eat up’ our own results; but even if we 
do to some extent, any remaining significant association between residual valuations 
and acquisition probability would just strengthen our case for a finance-FDI effect. 
In summation, then, if mispricing is correlated within source countries (in line 
with a segmentation effect, for instance), residuals from regressions of Equation 3 are 
proxies for a particular financial advantage for undertaking FDI. In the absence of 
source-country-specific determinants of residual valuations, this factor just captures a 
firm-specific financial advantage – a pure cost of equity factor and therefore a matter 
of superior discount factor – for undertaking investment in general (or, possibly, ac-
quisitions specifically), within or outside the firm’s country of residence. 
 
C. Industry-specific financial drivers of FDI   15
The possible analogy between the wealth-effect explanation for FDI of Froot and 
Stein (1991) and candidate motivations for a finance-FDI effect on the other hand, 
motivates a further exploration of the connection between firms’ (financial) character-
istics and the propensity to undertake cross-border investment. The arguments of 
Froot and Stein imply a greater exchange rate effect in certain industries, such as 
R&D-intensive ones, where investments are more knowledge intensive, innovations 
may be more easily internalized within the MNC, and financing constraints arising 
from information asymmetries are more pronounced. If there is a cost of capital effect 
working through a mechanism similar to that of the exchange rate, the industry speci-
ficity implication carries over to FDI-finance sensitivities, so that also financial fac-
tors are more important for firms in certain industries. A similar effect is implied by 
the result of, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998) that some industries are more dependent 
than others on external finance: for a firm which is heavily dependent on external fi-
nance, the relative effect on investment activity of having access to such finance is 
higher than for a less financially dependent firm. 
The next step in the analysis is therefore to test whether this implication is 
supported by the data. We test Hypothesis 2 by interacting each of the included finan-
cial characteristics with a proxy for knowledge intensity and with industry dummy 
variables, and adding the interaction variables to the basic regression specification 
(Equation 1). If more knowledge-intensive firms have a higher FDI-finance sensitiv-
ity, coefficients for the financial/knowledge-intensity interaction variables should ap-
pear with equal sign as the stand-alone finance variables. We also expect that coeffi-
cients for the industry interaction variables will turn out significant with equal sign for 
more knowledge-intensive industries and/or with opposite sign as the stand-alone fi-
nance variables for less knowledge-intensive industries.   16
 
D. The role of source country financial development 
It has been suggested that investment may be differently linked to stock market valua-
tions in different countries, depending on the country’s level of financial develop-
ment. For instance, Braun and Johnson (2006) juxtapose the ‘active informant’ view 
and the ‘sideshow’ view of investment-q sensitivities. 
The active informant view holds that the stock market is well able to predict 
‘fundamentals’, and managers – who are at an informational disadvantage and cannot 
predict fundamentals as well as the collected view of the market – use the price signal 
to make investment decisions. Better developed stock markets produce better price 
signals and therefore, to the extent that managers are aware of the varying quality of 
stock market signals across countries, generate higher investment-q sensitivities. The 
sideshow view, on the other hand, puts the market at an informational disadvantage, 
and the correlation between investment and stock prices is instead driven by the abil-
ity of managers and stock markets to predict fundamentals independently of each 
other. But given a constant, positive ability of managers to predict fundamentals, the 
correlation between investment and stock prices will be higher with increasingly effi-
cient stock prices. Therefore, this view also predicts higher investment-q sensitivities 
in better developed stock markets. 
It is not clear that these arguments carry over to the finance-FDI effect. In-
deed, if financial constraints are more binding and mispricing more prevalent in fi-
nancially less developed markets, the ‘cheap finance’ explanation for FDI should be 
more important in these markets. Similarly, the proactive-financial-strategy story of a 
firm breaking out of a segmented and illiquid home market to rid itself of a financial 
disadvantage and ‘internationalize’ its cost of capital does not fit a firm originating in   17
a country with a highly developed and internationally integrated domestic financial 
market. Our third main hypothesis is therefore that financial factor explanations for 
FDI are more important for firms originating in countries with less developed finan-
cial markets. To test Hypothesis 3, we use a similar strategy as in subsection C: we 
interact our financial variables with various measures of source country financial de-
velopment, and add the interaction variables to the basic model specification. We ex-
pect that the interaction variables between financial factors and home-country finan-
cial development should enter with opposite-sign coefficients. 
 
E. Are the results robust to the inclusion of host-country determinants of FDI? 
So far we have considered only firm-level determinants of FDI. This may be called a 
‘partial-equilibrium’ approach (with Blonigen (2005)), which may be motivated by 
the primary research question: which firms undertake FDI? However, a more ‘general 
equilibrium’-oriented approach to FDI determination would also consider the effect of 
the target market. Indeed, the notion that a country – or, more generally, a jurisdiction 
– can be more or less attractive as host for direct investments underpins most FDI re-
search.
10 
A difficulty with testing firm-specific and host-country-specific determinants 
simultaneously is to translate the FDI decision to an econometric specification that 
reflects the decision in a realistic way.
11 In order to distinguish between location de-
terminants, it is necessary to include observations for each potential destination coun-
try; to distinguish between firm-specific determinants, it is necessary to include firm-
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where 
 
* ''' ' ik i i k ik ik ACQ F X H C α βδ φ γ ε =+ + + + +  (4) 
*
ik ACQ  is the size of acquisitions undertaken by firm i in country k (where k is any 
country except the country of origin of i), Fi and Xi are firm-specific finance and other 
characteristics, as previously, Hk are factors specific to host country k (the target 
firm’s home market), and Cik are control variables which may vary over firms or 
across countries.  
The total number of observations for this regression is N=I×K, where I is the 
number of firms, and K is the number of potential destination countries. In other 
words, for each of the I firms, we have separate observations for each possible desti-
nation country. It is not clear that these observations are independent. Specifically, it 
is not clear that firm i’s decision not to invest in country k is independent of its deci-
sion not to invest in country m. If it is not, we end up with a large number of zeros on 
the left hand side of Equation 4 that are correlated within cross-section units. More-
over, the number of potential destination countries is, presumably, every single coun-
try in the world. But the number of total observations in a regression of Equation 4 
increases exponentially with the inclusion of each additional country, which makes it 
intractable and increases the serial correlation problem just mentioned. On top of all 
this, if the advantages of investing in a particular destination country arise because of 
finance-related reasons, this should already be accounted for in our firm-level regres-
sions. 
For these reasons, we argue that the regressions on firm-specific factors alone, 
outlined in subsections II.A through D.II, give a better account of the investment deci-
sion process – perhaps not a full account, but a more realistic one than that repre-
sented by Equation 4. However, in order to complete the picture, and to check robust-  19
ness, we still go ahead with the inclusion of host-country factors. The analysis is con-
ducted in a stepwise manner. 
The number of included possible host countries must, as mentioned, be limited 
due to various practical considerations. First, we eliminated the countries that did not 
receive any direct investment from the firms in our sample. Second, several of the re-
maining countries were eliminated because of lack of adequate data. The non-
randomness of this process of elimination introduces the risk of sample selection bias 
as regards the country-specific variables. To take this into consideration, we adopt the 
standard Heckman (1979) approach of first estimating a simple probit model of the 
selection process. From this estimation we obtain a country-specific variable, the in-
verse Mills-ratio (typically termed ‘lambda’), which − by proxying for the probability 
of being included in the sample in the first place − corrects Model 4 for the potential 
selection bias. The selection model takes the form: 
 ' j jj SEL Z α βε = ++  (5) 
where SELj takes on unit value if country j was selected as a possible destination 
country for investment in the final regressions, and zero otherwise. The countries J 
are a random sample drawn from the population of all possible destination countries, 
and Zj is a vector of country characteristics believed to correlate with the decision to 
include the country in the final sample of possible destination countries. 
The next step is to estimate the full model, including both firm-specific and 
destination-country-specific characteristics, as described by Equation 4. The model is 
estimated in a pooled cross-section setting in order to account for the panel-like struc-
ture of the dataset that follows from considering variation in two dimensions – the 
firm (cross-section) dimension, and the host-country dimension. 
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F. Further robustness tests: the number of acquisitions undertaken 
Our dataset allows us to identify not only which firms in the sample made a foreign 
acquisition, but also how many foreign acquisitions each of these firms made. Al-
though we are primarily interested in determining which firms made any foreign ac-
quisitions, we make use of this information for a final alternative model specification 
which provides us with a further robustness test of the results obtained. The test en-
tails performing negative binomial regressions of the form: 
 ''', ii i i i NOACQ F X C α βδ γε = ++++  (6) 
where NOACQi is the number of acquisitions made by firm i, and the right hand side 
is defined as previously. Expectations on the coefficients are also in analogy with 
Equation 1. 
 
III. Definitions and data set 
In this section we describe the variables used (for a detailed listing, see the data ap-
pendix) and their sources, and provide some summary sample statistics. 
 
A. Variable definitions and data sources 
The methodology described in the previous section was applied to a sample of Euro-
zone firms, and most of the variables used are based on financial statement items for 
these firms from between 1996 and 2001 as reported in the COMPUSTAT Global In-
dustrial Database. Using Eurozone firms presents a particular advantage because it 
minimizes the risk of mixing up the financial-variable effect with a possible exchange 
rate effect (which is easy enough to control for with country-level data, but considera-
bly more cumbersome with firm-level data), but still permits us to explore the effect 
of variation in certain source country characteristics, as outlined in section II.   21
The dependent variable (the foreign acquisitions dummy) comes from the 
Thomson Mergers and Acquisitions Database, which contains data on acquisitions 
worldwide. The COMPUSTAT firm-level data were matched with the Thomson data, 
which had previously been filtered to contain only cross-border deals completed in 
2000, where the acquirer was a firm with EMU-country origin. COMPUSTAT firms 
that appeared in the filtered Thomson data were flagged for the dependent variable.  
The financial variables used are proxies for the cost of equity, cost of debt, and 
credit rating, and an indicator cross-listing variable. The main proxy for the cost of 
equity is Tobin’s q, i.e. the market value over the book value of total assets. This 
measure of firm valuation is used extensively in the literature and was considered to 
be the most representative measure. As an alternative proxy for the cost of equity 
capital we use the sales/price ratio. We chose to relate price to sales rather than to 
earnings, since negative p/e or e/p ratios have no sensible interpretation, and to put 
sales in the numerator rather than in the denominator in order to avoid the skewness 
and outlier problem that occurs when some firms in the sample have very low sales 
(see, e.g., Smart and Zutter (2003)). 
The cross-listing dummy takes on unit value for firms that cross-listed their 
stocks on the NYSE, on NASDAQ, or on the London Stock Exchange during 1996-
2000. The variable was constructed using information in fact books and reports from 
each of these three stock exchanges. 
The cost of debt is simply the firm’s actual interest expenditure divided by its 
total liabilities, as reported in financial statements. The expected effect of the cost of 
debt on the dependent variable is, however, ambiguous. On the one hand, a reduction 
in the overall cost of capital through reduced cost of debt would, ceteris paribus, in-
crease the level of investment in general, indicating a negative relationship. On the   22
other hand, increased leverage may be a way to finance acquisitions, but will also in 
general tend to push up the credit risk premium inherent in the cost of debt, indicating 
a potential positive relationship between acquisition likelihood and cost of debt. 
As a proxy for firms’ credit rating we used Altman’s Z”-score, which is a con-
tinuous variable constructed from a number of balance-sheet items to reveal the firm’s 
credit risk (see Altman (2002)). In the absence of consistent and comparable series of 
actual ratings from international credit rating agencies, this provides us with a second-
best solution.  The basic conjecture is that an improved credit rating should increase 
acquisition probability, but the variable may be correlated with other cost of capital 
measures to the extent that the market uses ‘ratings’ as a basis for determining the rate 
of return at which to provide financing and/or to the extent that market prices enter 
into the production of ratings (this is indeed the case for the Z”-score, see sub-section 
III.B). As a final finance-related variable, we included free cash flow to proxy for in-
ternal financing (Stein (1997)). 
Variables for ‘traditional’ FDI determinants were chosen on the basis of the 
results of earlier empirical studies, or of surveys thereof (see e.g. Cantwell and Narula 
(2003); Blonigen (2005)). They include firm size, proxies for the importance of 
knowledge and capital intensity (intangible assets as a share of total assets, and the 
share of fixed capital), and profitability (return on assets). Firm-level control variables 
are industry and source country dummies. 
Source-country-specific variables are primarily various measures of financial 
development. We used three measures suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003): stock 
market capitalization over GDP, net equity issues over gross fixed capital formation, 
and private sector credit over GDP. Sources for these variables were IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (GDP, investment, and credit) and Eurostat (stock market   23
capitalization). Net equity issues were proxied as the year-on-year change in stock 
market capitalization, corrected for the change in stock prices as measured by Data-
stream’s overall market price index for each country. The data were collected and the 
variables calculated for each of the years 1996-2000, and then averaged. In addition to 
the above-mentioned three financial-development variables, we used the shareholder 
rights and creditor rights indices of La Porta et al. (1998). 
The variables for host-country FDI determinants used in the ‘full-size’ model 
described in subsection II.E are target market size, income level, production costs 
(proxied by average manufacturing wages), the rate of corporate income taxation, and 
indices for the level of corruption, and legal and political accountability. These are 
broadly in conformity with Blonigen’s (2005) listing of typical host-country effects 
on FDI. The data are from IMF’s International Financial Statistics or the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (GDP, population, and wage level), Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers (2000) (corporate taxes), Transparency International (transparency 
index), and from Kaufmann et al. (2003) (index of political system integrity). Defini-
tions of all the variables used appear in the data appendix. 
 
B. Basic sample statistics 
The total number of firms in the sample was 1459. All firm-specific variables were 
available for 1373 of these firms. Descriptive statistics for these variables appear in 
Table I. The finance-related variables are also divided between sample firms that un-
dertook FDI and firms that did not, and tested non-parametrically for significant dif-
ferences in distribution. As shown by these tests, firms that undertook FDI exhibit 
significantly different median values for four of the five included finance-related vari-
ables, as compared to non-FDI firms. In all cases, the differences are in the expected   24
direction (international acquirors have higher q, lower sales/price ratio, higher free 
cash flow, and higher ‘credit rating’). These observations serve as a preliminary indi-
cation of the potential explanatory power of financial factors. 
 
[Insert Table I] 
 
[Insert Table II] 
 
Table II shows that correlations between finance-related and other firm-
specific variables are often statistically significant but typically very low, with the ex-
ception of free cash flow and the return on assets. Within the group of finance-related 
variables, Tobin’s q and the Z”-score are rather highly positively correlated. We 
therefore initially avoid mixing free cash flow and ROA, and q and Z”, respectively, 
in the same regressions. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Baseline regression results 
Table III reports results from the baseline regressions (equation 1). Models 1 and 4 
use only the finance-specific variables with the two proxies for cost of equity, and the 
full set of source-country and industry dummies. In specifications 2 and 5, traditional 
firm-level FDI determinants are substituted for the control variables. Models 3 and 6, 
finally, use both financial and non-financial determinants and industry control dum-
mies (whereas the apparently unimportant source-country dummies were left out). 
The results from all the models confirm that several finance-specific factors affect the 
propensity to make foreign investments.   25
The most relevant finance factors are those directly related to access to com-
petitively priced equity (as indicated both by the cross-listing variable and the equity 
valuation proxies). In statistical terms, cost of equity and cross-listing are both highly 
significant. In economic terms, the effect of the cost of equity is small; for example, 
using the rule of thumb of dividing probit coefficients by 2.5 to arrive at approximate 
marginal probabilities (see Wooldridge (2002)), the coefficient estimates for Tobin’s 
q indicate that a unit increase in q raises the probability of foreign acquisitions by 
around 5 percent. The marginal increase in acquisition probability of recent cross-
listing, on the other hand, is substantial (upward of 20 percent using a similar ap-
proximation). 
The cost of debt is statistically insignificant and coefficient estimates are un-
stable. The effects of the two additional finance-related variables – internal financing 
and credit worthiness – appear to be of relatively minor importance. The coefficients 
for the first of these are statistically insignificant. The latter, which was excluded from 
models 1-3 due to its high correlation with Tobin’s q, appears statistically significant 
with the right sign in the last two specifications of Table III, but the coefficients indi-
cate an effect which is smaller in magnitude over the distribution of this variable than 
that of the directly equity-related variables. 
As regards traditional FDI determinants, firm size and high knowledge inten-
sity (as proxied by the share of intangible assets) increase the probability to invest 
abroad, as expected. The coefficients are economically and statistically significant and 
highly stable over the different specifications. Coefficients for industry dummies, fi-
nally, reinforce the impression that firms in sectors with higher knowledge intensity 
(such as durables, electronics, and services) are more likely to invest abroad.   26
Wald tests of specifications with and without the financial variables included 
indicate a very strong incremental explanatory power of the included financial vari-
ables. We infer from these results that financial factors clearly do matter for the deci-
sion to undertake a cross-border acquisition. 
 
[Insert Table III] 
 
B. Correcting for investment opportunities 
The results of the panel regressions on Equation 3, shown in Table IV, indicate that 
both Tobin’s q and the sales/price ratio are highly significant predictors of one-year-
ahead relative capital expenditure. The residuals from these regressions were aver-
aged over the sample period for each of the sample firms and the resulting averages 
constitute the ‘Residual q’ and ‘Residual sales/price’ measures used throughout the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
[Insert Table IV] 
 
Table V shows these measures applied to the baseline regression model. Specifica-
tions 1 and 2 are identical to models 1 and 3 in Table III; specifications 3 and 4 are 
identical to Table III’s models 4 and 6; all with the exception of the definition of the 
equity valuation proxies. The results are strikingly similar (with the perhaps some-
what surprising – given the consistency of the other results – exception of the mar-
ginal statistical insignificance of the cross-listing dummy in specification 2), and 
strongly suggest the maintained importance of the equity-related financial variables, 
even when corrected for a general investment-opportunity factor.   27
 
[Insert Table V] 
 
C. Financial effects of knowledge intensity and industry 
Table VI provides further insight into the effects of financial characteristics on foreign 
acquisition likelihood. In particular, it shows for which firms these characteristics 
matter. Here we have interacted each of the financial variables (except the cross-
listing dummy) with the proxy for knowledge intensity (intangible assets) and with 
the industry control dummies, since – as explained in sub-section II.C, some conceiv-
able mechanisms by which finance can influence FDI indicate that finance (particu-
larly the cost of equity) should be more important in more knowledge-intensive indus-
tries. 
This seems indeed to be the case. Looking first at columns 1 and 2, we see that 
both equity valuation measures lose their statistical significance as stand-alone vari-
ables, whereas the joint effect of equity costs and intangibles is very strong for both 
measures. It would appear, therefore, that the finance-FDI effect primarily obtains for 
firms with above-average knowledge intensity. Interactivity with industry dummies 
reveals no similar pattern of increased finance-sensitivity for knowledge-intensive 
industries, but indicates lower sensitivities for certain semi-heavy industries when q is 
used to proxy equity costs. This result would be in line with expectations insofar as 
these industries are less knowledge-intensive than the average sample firm. 
In contrast, the explanation for the indeterminate effect of overall debt costs 
does not seem to lie in industry-specific effects. Two industry/interest-rate interaction 
variables turn up significant with large positive coefficients – both relatively high-
knowledge industries (electronics and services). Knowledge intensity overall, how-  28
ever, does not interact significantly with debt costs. Credit ratings, finally, show an 
interaction pattern similar to that of equity costs: the share of intangibles reinforces 
the already positive effect of credit worthiness on FDI probability (and vice versa – 
both credit rating and intangibles lose their statistical significance as stand-alone vari-
ables in this specification), whereas no systematic pattern of interaction with industry 
dummies emerges. 
 
[Insert Table VI] 
 
D. The effect of source-country financial development 
The results of interacting financial FDI determinants with home-country financial de-
velopment are reported in Table VII. The results by and large confirm the arguments 
advanced in sub-section II.D – which are, in turn, broadly in line with the wealth ef-
fect/arbitrage explanation for the finance-FDI effect (Froot and Stein (1991); Blanch-
ard et al. (1993); Baker et al. (forthcoming)), as well as with the financial-
internationalization effect (Oxelheim et al. (2001)) – that finance matters more for 
firms from financially less developed economies. As indicated by previous specifica-
tions, it is mostly equity-related factors that matter. The results are somewhat less 
convincing than previously, however; indeed, the effect is absent or only marginally 
significant when the residual sales/price ratio is used to proxy the cost of equity and 
when equity issues over aggregate investment is used as the sole measure of stock-
market development. Also, the (marginally significant) positive interaction between 
equity valuation and shareholder rights in specification 1 is somewhat at odds with the 
‘financial disadvantage’ story, but may be a consequence of lower reliance on equity 
in countries with poorer protection for shareholders (and consequently a lower equity-  29
FDI effect in those countries). Among credit-related factors, we find that having a 
high creditworthiness has more of an impact on foreign acquisition likelihood for 
firms resident in countries where creditors have less legal protection. This finding cor-
responds well to the advanced hypothesis.  
 
[Insert Table VII] 
 
E. Controlling for host-country FDI determinants 
Table VIII reports a number of alternative specifications of the target country selec-
tion probit model. (Descriptive statistics and correlations for the included variables 
are reported in the data appendix.) As expected, the results are robust to alternative 
specifications. The sample-selection corrections (lambdas) finally used in the pooled 
regressions reported in Table IX are those implied by model 2 in Table VIII, based 
both on its middle-of-the-road coefficient estimates, the belief that Population and In-
come are the key variables, and the log-likelihood statistics. 
 
[Insert Table VIII] 
 
Regressions on both acquirer and target-country characteristics reinforce the conclu-
sions and overall impressions of previous results. Qualitatively, the results, reported in 
Table IX, are almost identical to the results in Tables III and V as regards firm-
specific regressors. The coefficient estimates, however, are smaller. This is not sur-
prising, since the coefficients now represent the probability that a particular firm will 
invest in a particular country (rather than the probability that the firm will make a for-
eign investment anywhere).   30
In addition, several target-country regressors turn out to be important explana-
tory factors, particularly market size, as measured by GDP or population, and absence 
of political risk, but also the income level is usually significant (and negative as ex-
pected). Overall, this suggests that both market seeking in other politically and eco-
nomically mature countries and restructuring/production planning are viable motives 
for European firms’ international acquisitions. 
Making use of the pooled cross-sectional character of the dataset, we detect 
significant firm-level and country-level contributions to the variance of the errors (not 
reported). The inclusion of the linear 2-way random effects specifications (Models 4 
and 5 in Table IX) can be seen as a way of controlling for this. With this specification, 
equity valuation, when measured as residual q turns (marginally) insignificant, 
whereas the residual sales/price ratio and the cross-listing dummy remain highly sig-
nificant. The linear models highlight the small magnitude of the coefficients (since 
they can be interpreted directly in terms of probabilities);
12 however, as previously 
mentioned, the coefficients now represent the probability that a particular firm will 
invest in a particular country, which makes them somewhat difficult to interpret as 
regards the firm-level regressors. On the whole, however, the qualitative similitude 
(with respect to these firm-level regressors) of these results with previous firm-level-
only specifications indicates that our previous results are indeed robust to the inclu-
sion of target-country FDI determinants. 
Finally, the selection bias correction factor turns out significant in only one of 
the specifications. Exclusion of the ‘lambdas’ does not alter the results to any signifi-
cant extent. 
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[Insert Table IX] 
 
F. Results of count regressions 
The last robustness tests are the count regressions on the number of acquisitions un-
dertaken. These tests confirm the positive effects of equity valuation and credit wor-
thiness on FDI, but the cross-listing dummy is now not statistically significant. In this 
regard, it mirrors results of some previous specifications, whereas other specifications 
have tended rather to ‘favor’ cross-listing over equity costs. In this, these last tests 
highlight the difficulty of pin-pointing the exact mechanism by which the finance-FDI 
effect occurs: a wealth-effect/mispricing explanation would emphasize the equity cost 
component, whereas a ‘proactive’ explanation would (perhaps) afford a greater role to 
the more unequivocally strategic cross-listing variable. 
 
[Insert Table X] 
 
V. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper we have argued that the standard models for explaining multinational 
firms’ foreign direct investment give insufficient heed to financial motives. In particu-
lar, we showed that the assumption of (at least partial) international capital market 
segmentation opens up a number of possible mechanisms for a direct cost-of-capital 
effect on firms’ incentives to undertake foreign investment projects in general, and 
perhaps foreign acquisitions in particular. 
Based on binary-response regressions on a sample of European non-financial 
firms and their foreign acquisitions, we found strong evidence in favor of an inde-
pendent equity-valuation effect on FDI. Key equity-related financial variables turned   32
out to be equally important as, or more important than, several more traditional firm-
level determinants of foreign investment. Specifically, our results show that firms 
with more highly valued equity, and firms which have recently cross-listed their eq-
uity on a large and liquid stock exchange, are more likely to make foreign acquisi-
tions. These results are qualitatively robust to alternative model specifications and 
largely independent of the measure for equity costs used. More importantly, they re-
main after these measures have been corrected for a general investment-opportunity 
effect. The effects on foreign acquisition likelihood of financial characteristics not 
directly related to equity, however, appear to be marginal. The effects of debt costs 
and internal financing are, overall, indeterminate, and usually statistically insignifi-
cant. Our proxy for credit worthiness, on the other hand, is often statistically signifi-
cant, but typically small in economic terms. 
In addition, we found that financial determinants are more important for firms 
originating in countries that are relatively less financially developed – a finding con-
sistent with hypotheses advanced. Also in line with arguments made in the paper is 
the finding that financial motives for FDI are significantly stronger for more knowl-
edge-intensive firms. However, we found only mixed evidence of variation in FDI-
finance sensitivity by industry more generally. 
Our conclusion is that an explicit consideration of firms’ financial positions is 
necessary to explain cross-border investment. However, more work is needed on iden-
tifying the exact mechanism whereby the finance-FDI effect occurs. We have noted at 
several instances in the paper the difficulty of pin-pointing that mechanism, and our 
results are consistent with several candidate rationalizations for the effect that have 
appeared in, or can be derived from, the literature. These include a wealth/arbitrage 
effect (Froot and Stein (1991); Baker et al. (forthcoming)), and a proactive-financial-  33
strategy effect (Oxelheim et al. (2001)). As briefly suggested in the paper, the ques-
tion of by what mechanism the finance-FDI effect occurs is linked to the mode of in-
vestment. Since it is possible that the finance effect is particularly prevalent for for-
eign acquisitions, more work is needed to determine whether the effect is similar for 
other types of investment. As shown by, for instance, Shleifer and Vishny (2003), the 
question of investment mode, finally, is not separated from that of payment mode. We 
would expect that firms that wish to exploit a favorable equity valuation by investing 
would do so by paying with equity. In the context of foreign direct investment and 
cross-border acquisitions, this too remains to be researched.   34
Appendix: Variable definitions and additional statistics 
 
[Insert Tables A1-A6]   35
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 Such as size, monopoly power, better resource capability and usage (Bain (1956)); economies of 
multi-plant structures and common ownership (Caves (1980)); and advantages of multinationality that 
enable MNCs to capitalize on differences in factor endowments and other local market conditions. 
(Kogut (1985)). 
2 Under the assumption of efficient and internationally integrated financial markets, of course, any firm 
can source its funding anywhere, regardless of country of residence, and so no firm will have a finan-
cial advantage over any other. Moreover, exchange rates will have no effect on FDI, because any effect 
of exchange rates on the price of a foreign investment will have a reverse effect when the investing 
firm exchanges the returns on the investment back to its home currency: exchange rate fluctuations will 
not have any net effect on the relationship between the investment and its returns, and so will not pre-
sent an advantage for foreign firms over domestic firms or vice versa. 
3 A case in point, Dunning (1993) considers financial market imperfections and recognizes that firms’ 
propensity to own foreign income-generating assets may be influenced by financial and exchange rate 
variables. He also discusses a ‘financial asset advantage’ which refers to “firms’ superior knowledge 
of, and access to foreign sources of capital”, but essentially finds this advantage to be a by-product of 
the size, efficiency and knowledge capital of the firm. 
4 For example, Bodnar et al. (2003) conclude that “[f]or all countries, it is clear that […] local-country 
risk premium dominates the pricing. This is a striking empirical fact […]” (p. 24). Similar conclusions 
may be found in surveys of the empirical literature, such as Karolyi and Stulz (2003). Even the most 
recent empirical studies fail to find support for a far-gone international integration in capital markets. 
For instance, Lombardo and Pagano (2006) construct a model of international equity markets, which 
produces clear implications for parameter estimates depending on whether the markets are integrated or 
not; when put to the data, the hypothesis of international equity integration can be clearly rejected re-
gardless of time period, geographical coverage, and proxy variables used. Brealey et al. (2005) study 
changes in betas from cross-border mergers, and find that the observed changes are only consistent 
with the assumption of equity market segmentation. The inevitable conclusion is that firms must use 
local pricing models also to discount foreign investment projects, because their cost of equity is deter-
mined in the (segmented) market where it is raised, i.e., the home market.   42
                                                                                                                                            
5 For instance, in Rajan and Zingales (1998), financial development reduces the cost of external fi-
nance, which causes industries that are particularly dependent on external finance to grow faster in 
countries with well-developed financial markets; in a similar vein, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) find 
that finance can be treated as a comparative advantage, and is a robust determinant of industrial spe-
cialization between different countries. 
6 Blonigen’s (1997) exchange rate effect largely builds on an alternative view on FDI than that repre-
sented by traditional theories. The latter all presume that firms have firm-specific intangible assets 
which can be exploited by FDI, but empirically this is not always the case. This observation has 
spawned increased attention to asset-seeking (as opposed to asset-exploiting) FDI (Kogut and Chang 
(1991); Wesson (1993)).  Asset-seeking and asset-exploiting motivations for FDI are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive: for instance, Makino et al. (2002) found that Taiwanese firms were more likely to 
engage in asset-seeking FDI in developed countries if they were already relatively technologically ad-
vanced. Unlike Froot and Stein’s (1991) wealth effect, Blonigen’s exchange rate effect does not ‘auto-
matically’ translate into a finance effect since it builds directly on the valuation effects of exchange rate 
changes between the acquisition and return currencies. Without exchange rate changes, there are no 
such valuation effects. However, Blonigen’s theory is consistent with a general discount-factor-type 
effect under financial market segmentation. But more than that, if mispricing is local (rather than idio-
syncratic), and overvaluation is correlated with real exchange rate appreciation (e.g. through portfolio 
investment inflows), then Blonigen’s exchange rate effect will coincide with a general discount-factor 
effect. Of course, both imply that foreign and local firms value the acquired local asset differently. 
7 Even if we control for ‘fundamentals’ – in this case traditional firm-level FDI determinants – in the 
baseline regression, the case can be made as long as our proxies for these fundamentals are not perfect. 
8 Blanchard et al. (1993) note that q and investment will move together if markets value the firm at its 
‘fundamental’ value, but that in this case “q will not cause investment in any useful sense” (p. 116). If, 
on the other hand, markets and managers value the firm’s investment opportunities differently, then the 
stock market may drive investment. This could be due to information asymmetries between markets 
and managers, to speculative bubbles, or to valuation ‘fads’ causing misalignments of stock prices from 
‘fundamentals’. 
9 This is the measure traditionally used for estimating investment-q relationships, and consequently the 
one used in this paper as well (see data appendix for exact definitions and sources).   43
                                                                                                                                            
10 For example, Dunning’s (1977) OLI framework affords a prominent position to ‘Location’ determi-
nants of FDI; the ‘new economic geography’ is primarily concerned with explaining the spatial pattern 
of direct investment flows; etc. 
11 Cf. Blonigen’s (2005) contention that the emphasis in the empirical FDI literature on partial-
equilibrium explanations for FDI is “due to the difficulty of building a model that accounts for general 
equilibrium features that is tied back to microeconomic decision making” (p. 392). 
12 On the other hand, the linear specifications have the disadvantage that they assume a constant mar-
ginal probability (of undertaking foreign investment, in this case).   44
Table I. Descriptive statistics, firm-specific variables 
The table reports summary statistics for the included firm-level variables. Summary statistics for finan-
cial variables are reported separately for firms that undertook cross-border acquisitions (acq.) and those 
that did not (non-acq.), as well as for all sample firms (all). The ‘Test’ column reports the Wil-
coxon/Mann-Whitney rank-based test statistic for the null hypothesis that acq. and non-acq. groups 
have equal distributions around the median. ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of 
equal medians at the 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
  Firm group  Mean Std. dev. Median Test  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
Financial variables                
Tobin’s q All  1.66  1.31  1.27    0.44  17.0  1392 
 Acq.      1.52         
 Non-acq.      1.23  6.64***      
Sales/price All 2.98  3.52  1.84   0.00  30.7  1389 
 Acq.      1.32         
 Non-acq.      2.07  5.35***      
Cost of debt  All  0.027 0.015  0.026    0.000  0.125  1452 
 Acq.      0.026         
 Non-acq.      0.026  0.016       
Internal financing  All  0.004 0.073  0.012    -0.918 0.594  1421 
 Acq.      0.018         
 Non-acq.      0.011  2.68***      
Credit rating  All  4.07  3.81  3.16    -16.0  31.6  1373 
 Acq.      3.35         
 Non-acq.      3.07  2.35**       
                
Other variables                
Size   5.88  1.88  5.68    1.34  11.7  1457 
Intangibles   0.070 0.10  0.027   -0.002 0.84  1454 
Capital intensity    0.31  0.19  0.27    0.00  0.97  1456 
Sales/employee   5.24  0.71  5.19   0.65  7.79  1418 
ROA   0.079 0.079  0.079    -0.71  0.60  1455 
                
Dummy variables
a                
Acquisition              270 
Cross-listing             38 
 
Note: 
a) The figure indicates the number of positive observations, i.e. for the acquisition variable the number 
of firms that undertook cross-border acquisitions in 2000, and for the cross-listing variable the number 
of firms in the total sample that cross-listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or LSE sometime during 1996-2000. 
   45 
Table II. Pearson Correlations, firm-specific variables 
The table reports pairwise regular Pearson correlation coefficients for the included firm-level variables. ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no correlation 
at the 5% and 1% significance level (2-tailed), respectively. 









Tobin’s q -0.36***  -0.11***  0.06**  0.68***  -0.08***  0.10***  -0.11***  0.05  0.27*** 
Sales/price   0.06**  -0.09**  -0.36***  -0.02  -0.13***  -0.06**  0.10***  -0.24*** 
Cost of debt      -0.08***  -0.16***  -0.09***  0.01  0.17***  -0.02  -0.04 
Internal  financing      0.28***  0.07***  0.01  -0.18***  0.02  0.64*** 
Credit  rating       -0.19***  0.01  -0.26***  -0.03  0.49*** 
Size        0.13***  0.14***  0.08***  0.06** 
Intangibles         -0.27***  -0.08***  0.02 
Capital  intensity          0.00  -0.02 
Sales/employee           0.04 
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Table III. Determinants of foreign acquisition likelihood, baseline cross-sectional regressions 
The table shows coefficient estimates from probit regressions of a foreign acquisition dummy on firm-specific characteristics. The dependent variable is an indicator variable 
taking on unit value if the firm undertook a cross-border acquisition during the sample period, and zero otherwise. The models use two different proxies for the cost of equity 
– Tobin’s q (models 1-3), and the sales/price ratio (models 4-6) –, other firm-level financial characteristics, and different combinations of traditional non-financial FDI de-
terminants and control variables to estimate foreign-acquisition likelihood. Definitions of the included variables appear in Table A1 of the Appendix. All coefficients are re-
ported with standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
level, respectively. 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept  -2.02 (0.64)***  -2.55 (0.37)***  -3.78 (0.37)***  -1.64 (0.67)**  -2.47 (0.40)***  -3.67 (.38)*** 
         
Financial variables         
Tobin’s q  0.09 (0.03)***  0.14 (0.03)***  0.13 (0.03)***       
Sales/price        -0.07 (0.02)***  -0.04 (0.02)**  -0.04 (0.02)** 
Cross-listing  1.04 (0.24)***  0.69 (0.26)***  0.53 (0.25)**  1.14 (0.25)***  0.76 (0.27)***  0.60 (0.26)** 
Cost of debt  0.58 (2.96)  3.49 (3.05)  2.13 (3.12)  -0.15 (3.04)  3.43 (3.06)  1.78 (3.14) 
Internal financing  0.45 (0.63)      0.29 (0.65)     
Credit rating        -0.02 (0.01)  0.04 (0.02)**  0.02 (0.01)* 
         
Non-financial FDI 
determinants 
       
Size    0.29 (0.03)***  0.31 (0.03)***    0.31 (0.03)***  0.33 (0.03)*** 
Intangibles    1.49 (0.43)***  1.49 (0.43)***    1.45 (0.45)***  1.29 (0.44)*** 
Capital intensity    -0.33 (0.27)      -0.30 (0.28)   
Sales/employee    -0.11 (0.07)      -0.09 (0.07)   
ROA   0.37  (0.60)      -0.40  (0.69)   
         
Control variables
a         
Industry  Yes (16)  No  Yes (5)  Yes (17)  No  Yes (6)   47 
dummies (# sign.) 
Source-country 
dummies (# sign.) 
Yes (0)  No  No  Yes (0)  No  No 
         
Summary         




0.08  0.17 0.20 0.09 0.18 0.21 
Log  likelihood  -601.1  -540.4 -522.0 -586.7 -525.7 -513.0 
Test of exclusion 
restrictions
b 
32.0***  31.6*** 24.1*** 36.0*** 30.7*** 20.9*** 
 
Notes: 
a) The figures in parentheses refer to the number of dummy control variables that are significant at least at the 10% confidence level. 
b) Wald test (χ
2) for the exclusion of the included finance-related variables. Significance indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that coefficients for the included finance-
related variables are jointly zero.   48
Table IV. Panel estimation of equity valuation–investment equations 
The table shows coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions of yearly (1996-2000) observations 
of two equity valuation measures (Tobin’s q and the sales/price ratio) on one-year-ahead relative capi-
tal expenditure. The models are estimated with period fixed effects, and the coefficient estimates are 
reported with White standard errors robust to serial correlation and time-varying variances in parenthe-
ses. *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero at the 1% signifi-
cance level. 
 Dependent  variable 
  Tobin’s q (at time t)  Sales/price ratio (at time t) 
Intercept  1.45 (0.04)***  3.13 (0.10)*** 
Capital expenditure (at time t+1) 0.46  (0.10)***  -0.47  (0.08)*** 
    
Fixed effects  Yes (period)  Yes (period) 
Adj. R
2 0.04  0.01 
Obs. 4977  4942 
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Table V. Determinants of foreign acquisition likelihood, cross-sectional regres-
sions with ‘residual’ equity valuation measures 
The table shows coefficient estimates from probit regressions of a foreign acquisition dummy on firm-
specific characteristics. The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking on unit value if the firm 
undertook a cross-border acquisition during the sample period, and zero otherwise. The models esti-
mate foreign-acquisition likelihood using cost of equity measures corrected for general investment op-
portunities – ‘Residual q’ (residuals from a regression of Tobin’s q on future relative capital expendi-
ture; models 1-2), and ‘Residual sales/price’ (residuals from a regression of the sales/price ratio on fu-
ture relative capital expenditure; models 3-4) –, other firm-level financial characteristics,  and different 
combinations of traditional non-financial FDI determinants and control variables. Definitions of the 
included variables appear in Table A1 of the Appendix. Non-financial FDI determinants that turned out 
consistently insignificant in the baseline cross-sectional regressions (Table III) were dropped. All coef-
ficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
  1  2 3 4 
Intercept  -1.49 (0.68)**  -3.33 (0.38)***  -1.65 (0.71)**  -3.71 (0.40)*** 
       
Financial variables       
Residual q  0.11 (0.04)***  0.15 (0.04)***     
Residual sales/price      -0.06 (0.02)***  -0.05 (0.02)** 
Cross-listing  1.03 (0.25)***  0.41 (0.25)  1.18 (0.26)***  0.51 (0.27)* 
Cost of debt  0.30 (3.10)  2.99 (3.31)  -0.49 (3.19)  3.02 (3.35) 
Internal financing  0.71 (0.66)  -0.15 (0.70)  0.38 (0.69)  -1.04 (0.74) 
Credit rating      -0.01 (0.01)  0.04 (0.01)** 
       
Non-financial FDI 
determinants 
     
Size    0.30  (0.03)***  0.33  (0.03)*** 
Intangibles    1.67  (0.45)***  1.42  (0.46)*** 
       
Control variables
a       
Industry 
dummies (# sign.) 
Yes (14)  Yes (4)  Yes (16)  Yes (4) 
Source-country 
dummies (# sign.) 
Yes (0)  No  Yes (0)  No 
       
Summary       




0.08  0.20 0.09 0.21 
Log  likelihood  -564.9  -492.3 -551.8 -477.5 
Test of exclusion 
restrictions
b 
33.6***  22.4*** 36.8*** 26.4*** 
 
Notes:   50
a) The figure in parentheses refers to the number of dummy control variables that are significant at 
least at the 10% confidence level. 
b) Wald test (χ
2) for the exclusion of the included finance-related variables. Significance indicates re-
jection of the null hypothesis that coefficients for the included finance-related variables are jointly zero.   51
Table VI. Determinants of foreign acquisition likelihood, cross-sectional regres-
sions with industry/finance interaction variables 
The table shows coefficient estimates from probit regressions of a foreign acquisition dummy on firm-
specific characteristics. The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking on unit value if the firm 
undertook a cross-border acquisition during the sample period, and zero otherwise. The models esti-
mate foreign-acquisition likelihood using cost of equity measures corrected for general investment op-
portunities – ‘Residual q’ (residuals from a regression of Tobin’s q on future relative capital expendi-
ture; models 1 and 3), and ‘Residual sales/price’ (residuals from a regression of the sales/price ratio on 
future relative capital expenditure; models 2 and 4) –, other firm-level financial characteristics, tradi-
tional non-financial FDI determinants, and different combinations of interactivity between industry 
characteristics (as measured by the share of intangible assets and industry dummies) and the finance-
related regressors. Definitions of the included variables appear in Table A1 of the Appendix. All coef-
ficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 
Intercept  -2.84 (0.21)***  -3.16 (0.24)***  -2.86 (0.22)***  -3.00 (0.25)*** 
      
Financial variables      
Residual q  0.68 (0.46)    0.16 (0.04)***   
Residual  sales/price   -0.10  (0.11)   -0.06  (0.02)*** 
Cross-listing  0.67 (0.28)**  0.45 (0.27)*  0.39 (0.27)  0.57 (0.27)** 
Cost of debt  2.88 (3.33)  3.44 (3.24)  -8.27 (11.8)  2.11 (3.40) 
Internal financing  0.46 (0.74)  -0.63 (0.74)  -0.03 (0.71)  -0.73 (0.74) 
Credit rating    0.04 (0.01)***    -0.07 (0.08) 
      
Non-financial FDI determi-
nants 
    
Size  0.28 (0.03)***  0.31 (0.03)***  0.28 (0.03)***  0.31 (0.03)*** 
Intangibles  1.43 (0.45)***  0.81 (0.58)  2.15 (1.04)**  -0.08 (0.68) 
      
Interaction variables
a      
Intangibles × Residual q  1.96  (0.48)***     
Intangibles × Residual 
sales/price 
 -0.76  (0.29)***    
Intangibles × Cost of debt     -11.5  (34.5)  
Intangibles × Credit rating      0.41  (0.13)*** 
Industry × Residual q






   
Industry × Residual 
sales/price
a 
 None    
Industry × Cost of debt




Industry × Credit rating
a      D u r a b l e s :  
0.22 (0.10)** 
      
Summary      
Obs.  1209 1191 1209 1191 
McFadden pseudo- R
2 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.21 
Log  likelihood  -486.4 -481.6 -495.5 -474.2 
 
Note: 
a) Only coefficients significant at least at the 10% confidence level are shown.   53
Table VII. Determinants of foreign acquisition likelihood, cross-sectional regres-
sions with financial-development/finance interaction variables 
The table shows coefficient estimates from probit regressions of a foreign acquisition dummy on firm-
specific characteristics, allowing for interactivity between firms’ financial characteristics and their 
home-country financial development. The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking on unit 
value if the firm undertook a cross-border acquisition during the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
The models estimate foreign-acquisition likelihood using cost of equity measures corrected for general 
investment opportunities – ‘Residual q’ (residuals from a regression of Tobin’s q on future relative 
capital expenditure; models 1, 3, and 4), and ‘Residual sales/price’ (residuals from a regression of the 
sales/price ratio on future relative capital expenditure; model 2) –, other firm-level financial character-
istics, traditional non-financial FDI determinants, and different combinations of interactivity between 
the finance-related regressors and various measures of financial development in the firm’s country of 
residence. Definitions of the included variables appear in Table A1 of the Appendix. All coefficients 
are reported with standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient is equal to zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 
Intercept  -3.98 (0.69)***  -4.68 (0.78)***  -3.87 (0.62)***  -3.86 (0.64)*** 
      
Financial variables      
Residual q  0.18 (0.11)    0.16 (0.12)  -0.03 (0.13) 
Residual sales/price    0.01 (0.05)     
Cross-listing  0.97 (0.65)  1.37 (0.68)**  1.01 (0.71)  1.24 (0.68)* 
Cost of debt  -6.60 (15.7)  -3.32 (16.6)  -8.99 (15.7)  -10.4 (15.8) 
Internal financing  -0.66 (0.75)  -1.60 (0.78)**  -0.67 (0.75)  -0.53 (0.74) 
Credit rating    0.16 (0.06)**     
      
Non-financial FDI determi-
nants 
    
Size  0.30 (0.03)***  0.34 (0.03)***  0.31 (0.03)***  0.30 (0.03)*** 
Intangibles  2.01 (0.50)***  1.79 (0.52)***  2.01 (0.50)***  1.99 (0.50)*** 
      
Financial development vari-
ables 
    
Stock market cap  0.17 (0.34)  0.28 (0.35)  0.24 (0.18)   
Equity issues  0.34 (1.41)  -0.26 (1.44)    0.78 (0.76) 
Private credit  0.15 (0.59)  0.54 (0.72)  0.02 (0.52)  0.04 (0.49) 
Shareholder rights  0.11 (0.08)  0.05 (0.09)  0.12 (0.07)  0.11 (0.08) 
Creditor rights  0.09 (0.11)  0.19 (0.13)  0.08 (0.10)  0.08 (0.10) 
      
Interaction variables      
Stock market cap × Resid-
ual q 
-0.23  (0.10)**  -0.20  (0.10)**  
Shareholder rights × Resid-
ual q 
0.08 (0.05)*    0.07 (0.05)  0.04 (0.05)   54
Equity issues × Residual q      0.34  (0.44) 
Stock market cap × Resid-
ual sales/price 
 -0.04  (0.08)    
Shareholder rights × Resid-
ual sales/price 
 -0.03  (0.02)    
Stock market cap × Cross-
listing 
   -0.70  (0.90)  
Equity issues × Cross-
listing 
-1.66 (2.11)  -2.39 (2.15)    -2.71 (2.22) 
Private credit × Cost of debt  5.13 (16.6)  1.49 (17.9)  7.72 (16.6)  8.71 (16.7) 
Creditor rights × Cost of 
debt 
3.15 (3.28)  2.60 (3.37)  3.44 (3.28)  3.30 (3.27) 
Private credit × Credit rat-
ing 
 -0.09  (0.07)    
Creditor rights × Credit 
rating 
 -0.03  (0.01)**    
      
Control variables
a      
Industry 
dummies (# sign.) 
Yes (3)  Yes (3)  Yes (3)  Yes (2) 
      
Summary      
Obs.  1161 1144 1161 1161 
McFadden pseudo- R
2 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 
Log  likelihood  -456.5 -439.5 -456.5 -459.1 
 
Note: 
a) The figures in parentheses refer to the number of industry dummies that are significant at least at the 
10% confidence level.   55
Table VIII. Estimation result of the host-country sample selection model  
The table shows coefficient estimates from probit regressions of a selection dummy variable on basic 
country characteristics. The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking on unit value if the coun-
try was included in the sample of potential host countries in the regressions estimating foreign-
acquisition likelihood using both firm- and host-country-level regressors (reported in Table IX). The 
independent variables proxy for target market size (population), level of development (income), cor-
ruption/political risk (transparency and accountability), and distance (dummy variables indicating the 
geographical region of the country). These selection regressions constitute the first step in the Heckman 
(1979) two-step approach to correcting for potential selection bias. All coefficients are reported with 
standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal 
to zero at the 1% significance level. 
  1 2 3 4 
Intercept  -6.46 (1.10)***  -13.6 (2.89)***  -16.1 (2.99)***  -8.56 (1.27)*** 
     
Population  0.52 (0.10)***  0.99 (0.24)***  1.04 (0.22)***  0.67 (0.11)*** 
Income  0.92 (0.15)***  1.54 (0.36)***     
Transparency     0.94  (0.20)***   
Accountability       1.06  (0.25)*** 





No  Yes (3)  Yes (3)  Yes (4) 
     




0.55 0.75 0.74 0.62 
Log  likelihood  -45.1 -24.6 -25.5 -37.5 
 
Note: 
a) The figures in parentheses refer to the number of industry dummies that are significant at least at the 
10% confidence level.   56 
Table IX. Determinants of foreign acquisition likelihood, pooled regressions with both firm-level and host-country-level regressors 
The table shows coefficient estimates from regressions of a foreign acquisition dummy on both firm-specific and host-country-specific characteristics. The dependent variable 
is an indicator variable taking on unit value if the firm undertook a cross-border acquisition during the sample period, and zero otherwise. The models estimate foreign-
acquisition likelihood using cost of equity measures corrected for general investment opportunities – ‘Residual q’ (residuals from a regression of Tobin’s q on future relative 
capital expenditure; models 1-3), and ‘Residual sales/price’ (residuals from a regression of the sales/price ratio on future relative capital expenditure; model 4) –, other firm-
level financial characteristics, traditional non-financial firm-level FDI determinants, and traditional host-country-level FDI determinants. The regressions control for possible 
sample selection bias as regards the included host-country sample in the sense of Heckman (1979) by the inclusion of a host-country-specific correction variable (‘lambda’ – 
the inverse Mills ratio from specification 2 in Table VIII). Definitions of the other included variables appear in Table A1 of the Appendix. All coefficients are reported with 
standard errors in parentheses. The linear regression (Model 4) is estimated with random effects in both the cross-sectional (firm) and the host-country dimension, and re-
ported with regular White heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero at the 5% and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
  1. Pooled probit  2. Pooled probit  3. Pooled probit  4. Pooled least squares 
(2-way random effects) 
5. Pooled least squares 
(2-way random effects) 
Intercept  -5.67 (0.67)***  -6.04 (0.44)***  -5.78 (0.68)***  -0.08 (0.03)**  -0.08 (0.03)** 
       
Financial variables       
Residual q  0.06 (0.01)***  0.06 (0.01)***    0.001 (0.001)   
Residual sales/price      -0.03 (0.01)***    -3.6 × 10
-4 (1.3 × 10
-4)*** 
Cross-listing  0.23 (0.08)***  0.22 (0.08)***  0.23 (0.08)***  0.02 (0.01)**  0.02 (0.01)** 
Cost of debt  0.61 (1.64)  0.62 (1.62)  0.67 (1.64)  0.02 (0.04)  0.03 (0.04) 
Internal financing  -0.38 (0.33)  -0.37 (0.33)  -0.87 (0.34)**  -0.004 (0.009)  -0.01 (0.01) 
Credit rating      0.02 (0.01)***    3.2 × 10
-4 (2.0 × 10
-4) 
       
Non-financial FDI determinants         57 
Size  0.19 (0.01)***  0.18 (0.01)***  0.20 (0.01)***  0.003 (0.001)***  0.004 (0.001)*** 
Intangibles  1.06 (0.18)***  1.04 (0.17)***  0.93 (0.18)***  0.03 (0.01)***  0.03 (0.01)*** 
       
Host-country FDI determinants       
Market size (GDP)  0.25 (0.02)***    0.25 (0.02)***  0.005 (0.001)***  0.005 (0.001)*** 
Population    0.19  (0.02)***     
Income  -0.18 (0.07)**    -0.19 (0.07)**  0.000 (0.001)  0.000 (0.06) 
Wage    -0.01  (0.03)     
Tax  -0.10 (0.07)  -0.02 (0.07)  -0.09 (0.07)  -0.004 (0.002)**  -0.003 (0.002)* 
Accountability  0.48 (0.07)***    0.49 (0.07)***  0.006 (0.001)***  0.006 (0.001)*** 
Political stability    0.42 (0.06)***       
Country selection correction 
(lambda) 
-0.48 (0.30)  -1.13 (0.32)***  -0.50 (0.31)  0.008 (0.01)  0.008 (0.01) 
       
Control variables
a       
Industry 
dummies (# sign.) 
Yes (7)  Yes (7)  Yes (7)  Yes (3)  Yes (6) 
       
Summary       
Obs.  51686 51686 50912 51686 50912 
Regression F      13.7***  13.9*** 
Durbin-Watson       1.95  1.96 
Adj. R
2 (weighted)        0.01  0.01 
McFadden pseudo- R
2 0.18  0.17  0.19    
Log likelihood  -1881.4  -1912.3  -1840.0     
 
Note: 
a) The figures in parentheses refer to the number of industry dummies that are significant at least at the 10% confidence level.   58
Table X. Determinants of the number of foreign acquisitions 
The table shows coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions of the number of foreign ac-
quisitions on firm-specific characteristics. The dependent variable is a count variable indicating the 
number of cross-border acquisitions undertaken by a firm during the sample period. The models esti-
mate foreign-acquisition likelihood using cost of equity measures corrected for general investment op-
portunities – ‘Residual q’ (residuals from a regression of Tobin’s q on future relative capital expendi-
ture; model 1), and ‘Residual sales/price’ (residuals from a regression of the sales/price ratio on future 
relative capital expenditure; model 2) –, other firm-level financial characteristics, traditional non-
financial FDI determinants, and industry control variables. Definitions of the included variables appear 
in Table A1 of the Appendix. Non-financial FDI determinants that turned out consistently insignificant 
in the baseline cross-sectional regressions (Table III) were dropped (excepting the dependent variable, 
specifications below are identical to those in Table IV, models 2 and 4). All coefficients are reported 
with standard errors in parentheses. ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cient is equal to zero at the 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
  1 2 
Intercept  -5.46 (0.70)***  -5.96 (0.70)*** 
    
Financial variables    
Residual q  0.24 (0.06)***   
Residual sales/price    -0.09 (0.03)*** 
Cross-listing  0.33 (0.31)  0.32 (0.30) 
Cost of debt  1.24 (5.24)  1.10 (5.13) 
Internal financing  -0.79 (1.05)  -2.09 (1.07)** 
Credit rating    0.05 (0.02)** 
    
Non-financial FDI determinants    
Size  0.52 (0.04)***  0.55 (0.04)*** 
Intangibles  2.48 (0.65)***  2.03 (0.63)*** 
    
Control variables
a    
Industry 
dummies (# sign.) 
Yes (2)  Yes (3) 
    
Summary    
Obs. 1209  1191 
Adj. R
2 0.13  0.28 
Log likelihood  -835.0  -810.9 
 
Notes: 
a) The figures in parentheses refer to the number of industry dummies that are significant at least at the 
10% confidence level.   59
Table A1. Variable definitions 
Variable Description  Source 
Dependent variables    
ACQ (acquisition indicator)  Takes on unit value if a foreign acquisition was 
undertaken in 2000, zero otherwise 
Thomson M&A 
database 
NOACQ (integer count 
variable) 
Number of foreign acquisitions undertaken in 2000  As above 
    
Financial variables    
Cross-listing  Dummy variable taking on unit value if the firm 
cross-listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or LSE in any of 
the years 1996–2000, zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
and fact books 
from each stock 
exchange 
Tobin’s q  The sum of market value of equity and book value 






Sales/price ratio  Total sales divided by market value
a As  above 
Cost of debt  Average cost of debt: natural logarithm of (1 + in-
terest expenditure over total liabilities)
a 
As above 
Credit rating  Average Z”-score
a,b  As above 
Internal financing  Free cash flow divided by total assets
a As  above 








Intangibles Intangible  assets over total assets
a As  above 




Sales/employee  Natural logarithm of the ratio of total sales (in thou-
sands of USD) to number of employees
a 
As above 
ROA  Return on assets: EBIT divided by total assets
a As  above 




Capital expenditure  Capital expenditure at time t divided by Plants, 
property, and equipment (total, net) at time t-1 
As above 




Stock market cap  Stock market capitalization divided by GDP
a Eurostat,  IFS 





Private credit  Credit to the private sector divided by GDP
a IFS 
Shareholder rights  Index of anti-director rights; higher value indicates 
better shareholder protection 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Creditor rights  Index of creditor rights; higher value indicates bet-
ter creditor protection 
As above 
    
Host-country variables    
Market size  Natural logarithm of GDP in mn USD
a IFS/WDI 
Population  Log of population in thousands
a As  above 
Income  Log of GDP/capita in ‘000 USD
a As  above 




Tax  The target country’s statutory corporate income tax 
rate, observed in 1999 
Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (2000) 
Transparency Corruption’s Perception Index (CPI), observed in 
2003; higher index value indicates less corruption 
Transparency 
International 
Accountability  Index of ‘Voice and accountability’, observed in  Kaufmann et al.   60
2000
c; higher index value indicates more democ-
racy 
(2003) 
Political stability  Index of ‘Political stability’, observed in 2000
c; 




a) These variables are observed for the years 1996-2000, and used in the cross-sectional regressions as 
the average of these yearly observations. 
b) Z” = 6.56 × (Working Capital/Total Assets) + 3.26 × (Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 6.72 × 
(EBIT/Total Assets) + 1.05 × ( Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities); see Altman 
(2002). 
c) In a small number of cases, where data were unavailable for 2000, observations are from 2002. 
   61
Table A2. Descriptive statistics, source country variables 
  Obs. Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max. 
Stock market cap.  12  0.64 0.30  0.16  1.33 
Equity issues  12  0.23 0.09  0.04  0.65 
Private credit  12  0.74 0.23  0.42  1.19 
Shareholder rights  12  2.08 1.13  0.00  4.00 
Creditor rights  12  1.67 1.18  0.00  3.00 
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics, host country variables 
  Obs. Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max. 
Market size  44  12.497 1.390  9.460  15.980 
Population 44  9.915 1.397  7.250  14.030 
Income 44  9.491 0.653  8.030  10.380 
Wage 44  6.721 1.044  4.520  9.480 
Tax 44  3.349 0.306  2.140  3.689 
Transparency 44  6.091 2.355  2.500  9.700 
Accountability 44  0.838 0.682  -1.370  1.640 
Political stability  44  0.81  0.63  -0.99  1.73 
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Table A4. Pearson correlations, host country variables 
** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no correlation at the 5% and 1% significance 
level (2-tailed), respectively. 








Population  0.89***        
Income  0.23  -0.24       
Wage  0.25  -0.09  0.73***      
Tax 0.34**  0.30**  0.08  0.08       
Transparency 0.03  -0.36**  0.83***  0.71***  -0.02     
Accountability -0.14  -0.42***  0.60***  0.39***  0.03  0.60***   
Political  stability -0.03 -0.42***  0.82***  0.58*** -0.07 0.85***  0.71*** 
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Table A5. Descriptive statistics, variables included in selection model 
 Obs.  Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max. 
Market  size  176  9.29 2.43 3.77  15.99 
Population  176  8.62 2.00 3.69  14.04 
Income 176  0.66  1.60  -2.38  3.84 
Transparency  176  4.28 1.96 1.30 9.70 
Accountability 174  0.03  0.95  -2.12  1.64 
Political stability  167  0.08  0.97  -2.83  1.73 
        
Dummy variables
a        
Selection indicator 
(dependent var.) 
44      
EU  15      
Europe,  other  29      
North  America  15      
Latin  America  20      
Asia/Oceania  34      
Africa/Middle  East  63      
OECD  30      
 
Note: 
a) The figures indicate the number of positive observations. 
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Table A6. Pearson correlations, variables included in selection model 
** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no correlation at the 5% and 1% significance 









Population  0.75***       
Income  0.57***  -0.11      
Transparency 0.33***  -0.15**  0.69***      
Accountability 0.21***  -0.22***  0.59***  0.60***     
Political stability  0.23***  -0.28***  0.66***  0.69***  0.70***   
Rule of law  0.49***  -0.06  0.82***  0.84***  0.72***  0.78*** 
 
 
 